Morena: a model of collaborative factionalism
Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero
Morena's electoral profitability seems to have no competition. The point is that collaborative factionalism does not mean homogeneity of public policies and ideological principles.
Morena's electoral profitability seems to have no competition.
There will not be a political party like the PRI again in Mexico.
Within the studies that tried to understand the prevailing logic of cohesion and discipline in the PRI that strengthened the Hegemonic Party model, political scientist Joy Langston can be located.
Is it budgetary or presidential power that incentivizes cliques to cooperate? What allows a party to develop the classification of participation under the principle: “within the system everything, even impunity; outside the system, ostracism, repression and death”? The CIDE professor considered that the control of public administration at all levels imposed the availability of jobs and patrimonialism that showed the rationality of remaining in a political monopoly and avoiding confrontation.
The idea is correct in several ways; However, with the need for economic openness and adaptability to the contexts generated by globalization, collaborative factionalism was exhausted.
Closed authoritarian models came to an end when the United States won the Cold War, open societies were the neoliberal axis of Western globalization.
The crisis of liberal democracy has allowed the return of collaborative factionalism and the possibility of authoritarianism.
It is true that Mexico has not managed to transition to an open society and that the obstacles of its political culture persist as an adaptive and functional colonialism to North American imperialism; Therefore, the convergence of multiple actors in Morena resembles the wild card device that the PRI meant.
Our country constitutes a tributary state of the United States and the toll grants licenses of all kinds to the ruling class.
The possibility that Morena will be established with the triumph of the presidency, governorships and various legislative and municipal executive spaces, has summoned partisan immigration in a high and significant proportion.
Neither the PRI nor the PAN caused partisan ruptures and abandonments in the post-Zedillism presidential experiences as National Regeneration is doing now.
Morena's electoral profitability seems to have no competition.
The point is that collaborative factionalism does not mean homogeneity of public policies and ideological principles.
The PRI empowered a political clique dedicated to political espionage because there was no other way to exercise control and discipline.
The secret police of the traditional Mexican political system ended up being disloyal to the institutions of the national state and subordinated itself to North American interests.
The route of electoral profitability and pragmatism is the shortest path for Morena to end up being the icing on the cake PRI.
National does not have corporations, bases or structure to confront the political operators of the chiefs and turncoat politicians who now cry crocodile tears over the social issue.
What guarantees loyalty and discipline to the next president of Mexico when these feudal barons are governors?
Morena's progressivism and left seem to have established themselves only in CDMX, with notable risks in the face of a hostile environment of electoral realignment.
The pure Morenistas outside the country's capital have been marginalized and even persecuted by the regional chiefs who managed to acquire the candidacies for the state executive.
More than a scenario of divided government, there is a regime of ungovernability and blockade of the federation, Morena must abandon its progressive and nationalist agenda to converge with regional interests that have always been conservative and oligarchic.
There will not be a political party like the PRI again in Mexico.
The analysis of the time variable allows us to understand that Morena does not have the organizational or political capacity that the Official Party achieved.
It is positive that AMLO does not behave as did General Plutarco Elías Calles or General Lázaro Cárdenas, the problem lies in the fact that the regions continue to be governed by Maximino Ávila Camacho and Gonzalo N. Santos now with greater power, violence, cynicism and impunity .
The decomposition of the Mexican political system only promoted federalism to which Morena seems to pay vassalage and govern it.
Rather than collaborative factionalism, National Regeneration employs collaborative and circumstantial chiefdom to manage a transition that is being conducted without meaning.