The axis of the Puebla political debate

 The axis of the Puebla political debate

Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero

For some Morena Marxists, the caciquil chapulinism represented in the imposition of candidates is preferable to the right's advancement; the conservative groups are more dangerous than the caciquil fiefdoms for the Fourth Transformation to achieve its second floor. Be?

The neoliberal project, Foxism and Peñanietism tried to come to an agreement with the caciquil fiefdoms and that was how they succeeded. Manuel Camacho Solís, although he accused an excess of pragmatism in the national political class, had a practical perspective based on the experience of revolutionary nationalists in Asia; but, after the Salinist failure, he resumed it with moderation and ended up defending the pacts - at a disadvantage - with the traditional fiefdoms to balance different groups, cliques and leaders. His political strategy, both combative and centrist, was a total failure. The compact group that was imposed on the fiefdoms through the surprise strategy did not work, nor does change without rupture work.

True revolutionary transformation cannot be deceived. Constitutionalism, for example, could not take control of the country until the revolutionary Thermidor was finished. Only after the extreme radicalization of the Carrancista Grupo Sonora, the regime of the Mexican revolution was able to build institutions such as the Party, Presidentialism and Revolutionary Family that would channel the State and social justice. After its exhaustion, the Mexican political system has been intervened and at the full disposal of the United States and any other imperialism.

During the time of the Hegemonic Party, the PRI included the caciques, although it energized their circulation through a healthy political alternation and demobilization; The PRI was a caciquil, although it destroyed and controlled the caciques of many regions. The Great Chief was the president, but even the head of the Executive Branch had limited power: the six-year term. And there was no divine faculty that generated transexenality.

This was the circularity of the elites and the collaborative factionalism of the PRI until the exhaustion of the political project, as well as the social fabric. The inability of the political system to regenerate caused the chiefs and their factions to weaken the party and society. Neoliberalism and democracy were not consolidated because they lacked the strength to regulate and control chiefdom, fiefdoms and invisible power. Will the fourth transformation be the final chapter of this long transition via competitive elections?

Preferring fiefdoms to authentic disputes with the right is nothing other than rejecting the impulse for transformation and preferring gatopardismo to perpetuate the patrimonialism of Hispanic Feudalism, the Habsburg Model. What does it mean to agree with the fiefdoms? Dosage the poison of quietism, fill with the aroma of flowers in the poison of conservatism. Doesn't university Marxism have the intellectual preparation to realize that the caciques are extremely conservative?

Now, the fiefdoms represent the drug trafficking of the main global kingpin: NarcoAmérica.

Mexico became a State in Crisis since the arrival of neoliberalism and has reached the extreme. If the Fourth Transformation does not decide to promote institutional values, it will lead to the maximum risk of collapse of the political system.

Caciquismo has been the great hindrance of Ibero-American culture, the caciques are the ayatollahs of the anti-modern black revolution. They do not represent anything, neither regions, nor classes, nor identities, they are abusive and criminal personalist leaders.

The caciques were the first line of struggle that Falangism and Pinochetism had, they are the cracks and embers of fascism. They have the strength to generate civil animosity, a regional war, thanks to their clientelism and form of autonomous regional dominance. Salvador Allende was overthrown because the expectation of a successful socialist government could have radiated to the southern cone and generated a Latin American chain effect. The Pinochet dictatorship was a wedge to divide the region and weaken communist influence. In the end they got it. In any case, the left was displaced and destroyed. The left is denied in North American geopolitics, it is only a matter of time to exclude it from the political system.

The caciques are evidence of that empiricism that Manuel Camacho Solís questioned and that was causing so much damage in the country. The fiefdoms, like pillars of salt, seek to freeze time and the society they have hijacked. They represent the foundations of the most primitive authoritarianism. Supporting the Fourth Transformation in the chiefs is condemning the country to backwardness and the barbaric structure of slavery, vassalage and servitude. The alliance with the fiefdoms benefits the traditional right, which does not want time to move forward either.

Morena and her caciquil alliance have this perspective of suspending Mexican time, once again, weakening state institutionalization and centralization for the benefit of the caciques through the great electoral exchange. Again, we will be late to the story. The only thing that is institutionalized is patrimonial corruption.

The chiefs are the promoters of black revolutions to maintain the permanent backwardness of imperialist colonialism. Thus North American geopolitics is imposed on us anyway.

Andrew Paxman, returning to some assumptions of the Camachista diagnosis, proposes the chiefdom as a historical knot that limits the democratic evolution of the Mexican political system; the conflict they cause can lead to social collapse as was about to occur during the Peñanietismo. Feudalism is the new term to define this reality that was established after the failed Calderonista war, the country was put in the hands of drug trafficking and there is no way out.

The political system that the neoliberals tried to found could never defeat the fiefdoms and, later, could never summon them to a national pact for the democratic transition. In the end, the big losers were the technocrats and neoliberals. They never had the legitimizing capacity of capitalist liberal democracy and, little by little, they lost American support. The only element that controls the fiefdoms in the Mexican political system is the United States and it will continue that way.

The Fiefs expire again and system modernization comes to a prolonged halt. The Mexican political system will hardly move towards a socialist dimension, nor is prolonged party dominance in sight as in the time of the PRI. However, the fiefdoms are going to transmit power through a pragmatic canovism.

During the interventions of the candidates for the governorship of Puebla: Eduardo Rivera, for the Prianrd; Alejandro Armenta, for Morena and Fernando Morales, for Movimiento Ciudadano; All the candidates were reviled for their ties to Marinism. However, the expression is closer to the Morena candidate since, since the strange triumph of Miguel Barbosa, the Marinista operators were important for the movement of electoral structures.

According to the narrative of democratic transitions, it is not normal for Marinismo to have the possibility of resurfacing and reaching power; However, in spaces where political fiefdoms dominate municipal power and public administration, they control the succession. From this it is understood that groups that promoted Morenovallismo are found as collaborators of the second floor of the Marinista movement.

There is no political clique that achieves power unequivocally in the Puebla entity. Before the political alternation that brought the PAN to the state governorship, in reality the PRI and its cliques controlled power, as they continue to do now.

There is a shift from local power groups towards the National Regeneration Movement, from the fiefdoms that have distinguished the historical trajectory in Puebla. Traditional groups, fiefdoms, nodes and chiefdoms, execute collaborative factionalism to retain control of the entity. Those groups or characters that do not agree with them are not included in the rotation by the public administration.

Marinismo, in its first stage, decided to rely on Chiapas groups, Lebanese oligarchies and their personal clique to achieve national power. He did not achieve his goal, because traditional groups sabotaged his project. Launching a program without considering local factions received the corresponding sanction and, thanks to that, Morenovallismo was able to form. Later, this group exercised that exclusion of which Mario Marín was accused and the elimination of non-conformists and dissidents was even more aggressive.

The political traditionalism of the entity now maintains its balance through the candidacy of Alejandro Armenta; Local politicians have gathered around Morenoballism and Marinism appears as the first level of the next government, but there are elements of other cliques such as Morenovallism, Melquiadism, and regional chiefdoms.

Puebla is a fiefdom of local political groups and they act according to their convenience; Even the regional Catholic high clergy also supports Morenoist Armentism. The local right relied on barbarism, but was never able to get a common project off the ground because the traditional chiefdoms are strong and aggressive.

Puebla returns to a dynamic of patronage, vassalage, caciquismo and clientelism. Rafael Moreno Valle, an autocrat who exceeded power until the sultanate, understood that the entity could not remain in that backwardness because it increased poverty and underdevelopment exponentially; However, the reality of the decomposition of the Mexican neoliberal regime granted new opportunities to populist and traditional groups.

It is true that in Puebla the middle classes, particularly in the most developed cities of the entity, can balance the vote and dispense a complete burden for Morenoism through electoral rationality. However, the civic, social and urban movements of Puebla have not been able to break the caciquil dynamic of political realism. Even Morena capitulated most of its candidacies to achieve a supposed legislative majority that appears complicated.

The national regeneration movement also runs the risk of becoming extinct after this year's elections, the fiefdoms are weighing the formation of regional parties and the exercise of transfuguism to accommodate a reality where the power of the Mexican presidency remains weak and the regions hijack governance. The capitulation of the Morenoist candidates is a sign of the weakness of momentum that the Fourth Transformation had from the beginning.

Catch All Party or Rebellion of the Masses?

 Catch All Party or Rebellion of the Masses?

Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero

Morena's internal processes have been highly questioned by the inconsistency between state committees and national leadership. He has called the attention that the principles of gender parity, political pragmatism and acclamation popular; They have mixed opportunistically to legitimize the candidatesselected. The result scales in the perception of internal processes debated and poorly sanitized, John Ackerman - for example - only admits that four candidates for state governments of Morena are related to the principles of the fourth transformation, the others show the severe conflict that Morena has between its tendencies and the pragmatism of its leaders.

Although Morena has not been able to institutionalize itself as a political party, and much less like the hegemonic party that was the PRI, the approach to the political model of the Cath All Party close to what the Party has done Democrat in the United States. While the Republicans intend to demonstrate and propose wasp puritanism in the candidates and policies that shape their action political-ideological; The case of the Democrats is interesting to think about as party catches everything, potty, dustpan and even pragmatist; because he has contacts with multiple actors that are accommodating to their different platforms and conjunctures of government. Morena has been feeding on a political transfuguism that justifies as good faith and God-fearing partisan migration; but, deep down, it is adopt any type of profile that decides to support the electoral profitability of the motion.

There is no rebellion of the masses as some academics and nostalgic for populist socialism, agreements between factions and territorial political operators that Joy Langston called “Factionalism” Collaborator". It is true that it can last a long time, as the PRI did during the stage of the Hegemonic Party; However, Morena is not the PRI but a movement strange of expansive networks from the Cardenista Liberation Movement National and PRI groups expelled during the era of neoliberalism.

Morena's internal processes only demonstrate the ineffable vocation for chaos that Mexican politics has. Collaborative Factionalism is sterile in the stage current crisis of political parties, the chiefs do not change their convictions and the Chambista opportunism is historic in our political culture. Factionalism is not contributes to the institutionality. It is noted that political parties such as we knew in Mexico tend to disappear and perspective is imposed American in a moderately fragmented bipolarism where the only ideology that persists on the conservative right, Morena will become a political wild card that will try to resemble the PRI and try to stabilize Mexican politics for another six-year term.

In Puebla, for example, the criterion of gender charity, as political scientist Pablo Majluf has called it, was not applied and this allowed Alejandro Armenta Mier to rise as the representative of the Fourth Transformation to succeed the current state government.

Armenta is a sign that Morena has become an all-out party, unfortunately this implies pragmatism at the highest level and the abandonment of any ideology. One of the main internal critics of Morenism, John Ackerman, only congratulated four gubernatorial candidates and conceded that the others had nothing to do with the principles of the Fourth Transformation.

The overlapping political decisions of the National Committee to the State Political Council of Puebla are simply not understood; The interpretation of imposition or negotiation indicates that Moreno's internal processes are highly questionable. If Morena is in the process of becoming a Catch All Party – as Viri Ríos says – immoral agreements are admitted as ex officio bureaucracy.

Among the Morenoist candidates questioned by his profile, Senator Alejandro Armenta is identified; But, in addition to his clear distance from the progressivism of the 4T, his membership in the Marinista clique makes it disconcerting that Claudia Sheinbaum – like Miguel Barbosa at the time – requires the regional support of this faction and its electoral structure to get votes. Marinism once again hits the nerves of a Puebla left that cannot get voters.

Although, observing the transformation of marinismo in the last ten years, there are probably other types of agreements that go beyond the territorial electoral operation.

Researcher Mauricio Saldaña Rodríguez from ICGDE-BUAP, former collaborator and security advisor at the Ministry of Public Security in Puebla, has presented some highly qualified studies regarding organized crime in the entity.

One of the main records of the researcher attached to the Institute of Government Sciences regarding the rates produced by crime is called EXECUTOMETER, which shows the record progress that intentional homicides related to crime have had; More than 500 are expected by the end of this year. The most significant thing is that Doctor Saldaña Rodríguez has pointed out the transversality of the circle that surrounds Senator Alejandro Armenta with the dispute that different organized crime groups have for the control of various criminal activities in the entity.

What type of candidates is Morena proposing? If there is no coordination between the National Executive Committee and the State Political Council of National Regeneration, at least there is coherence. In a country like Mexico, it is increasingly difficult to separate crime and politics. Puebla has been one of the states with the most electoral violence in recent years and, apparently, this is not going to change.

The late Miguel Barbosa pointed out a strange criminal force that constitutes the invisible power in the entity and that does not allow the dynamics of change; Finally, Barbosism gave way to the inertia of the Puebla muegano and Marinismo could regain power in the entity thanks to the restructuring of the de facto and invisible powers. The marinism that was once betrayed by local powers to achieve alternation, is now recycled to inhibit progressive transformation; So far it has been very successful in this purpose.

The indicators of democratic quality remain unchanged for the entity; along the floors, and will remain uneven for a long time. It is a Mexican custom to neglect parametric studies; however, despite the bad faith of politicians, there are academics who do not lose hope in data and measurements. Other university studies that few read and even fewer understand coincide with Saldaña Rodríguez; but they are explanatory of a Puebla that is seen as Sinaloa, Zacatecas or Guanajuato.

José Antonio Crespo has questioned Morena's pacts with politicians with questionable track records. How much will Marinismo affect Claudia Sheinbaum? At the time of the political crisis that the collaborators of Mario Marín's government resolved with cynicism and impunity, more than sixty percent of the population requested the removal of the state government. What happy accounts does Mario Delgado have to consider that fifteen years are enough to forget? Will Alejandro Armenta's reputation harm Claudia Sheinbaum? The CEN Morenista does not seem to care; But one thing is certain, the composition of Armentismo benefits the local right in various ways. It is certain that the anti-marinism that persists in the metropolitan areas of the entity will generate an electoral realignment for the candidates of the Broad Front for Mexico.

Armenta represents the decline of the Puebla left. The internal differences between the September 23 communist league were always between the rural and urban aspects of the implementation of communism.

Due to the historical speed of Mexico and colonialism, a proletariat has never been consolidated; the socialist revolution can only come from above, as revolutionary nationalism attempted at the time. The most effective guerrillas always sought to eliminate chiefdoms and commit direct actions against the structural devices representative of bourgeois hegemony; Few were brave, the PRI's military and cooptation power was relentless.

In the end, the left of multiple action was the one that prevailed and survives camouflaged as a Guadalupana communist PRI. The old snitching communists smile when they remember the assaults on soft drink and fried food trucks, but there is no happiness comparable to the cooptation that occurred in the golden era of the PRI.

The urban-rural dichotomy poses a two-way internal colonialism. The cities develop the economic structures for the nation to subsist and the countryside provides the material geographic elements of oligarchic power. Treasury and cacicazgo are synonyms that explain political leadership in Mexico; even the business sector could not survive without practicing latifundism, which implies a savings account for times of scarcity.

However, neither the countryside nor the city abandons poverty, people barely survive and, therefore, the formation of civic and political bases is impossible; clientelism is the only logic of mobilization. The leader who best manipulates political clientelism has the legitimacy of patrimonialism.

Colonialism justifies the informal economy and the absence of the state, the Metropolis determines the flow and dynamics of the dominated regions. Puebla has become extremely functional for North American imperialism, which explains the dominance of Alejandro Armenta Mier; But he still misses Morena's transfer.

Armenta: Fallen Soldier?

 Armenta Fallen Soldier?

Diego Martin Velazquez Caballero

There has been speculation regarding the interest of the oligarchic groups in the entity to sabotage Alejandro Armenta, in the same way that they did - and do - with Mario Marín.

The competition for the morenista candidacy for the government of the state of Puebla has generated ups and downs in the profile of the applicants. A singular case in recent times has been that of Senator Alejandro Armenta: he went from considering himself Incitatus to the center of marine polemics.

Indeed, the coverage and sponsorship of a political clique is not always the best letter of introduction in political contexts such as those that Puebla has experienced.

There has been speculation regarding the interest of the oligarchic groups in the entity to sabotage Alejandro Armenta, in the same way that they did - and do - with Mario Marín.

Puebla's political elites distinguish between the officers, the troops and the Indians -according to their own speech- and Armenta is a soldier, so he was not going to pass.

As in the marine scandal, the main responsible parties were not affected in any way, only the bureaucracy and middle managers.

The internal competition in Morena to designate the candidate who, most likely, has the greatest support of the electorate is still distant.

The situation of Senator Alejandro Armenta has forced him to purge his team of collaborators, listen to the environment of social demands and seriously propose a government project for Puebla committed to the Fourth Transformation.

It's the right thing to do, even from a turncoat perspective; people who abandon a political cause do so to reinvent themselves in another, to be someone different, not to disguise the usual hindrances and ghosts, change is a rupture or it is not change.

The Alejandro Armenta who faced morenovallismo and made the feat of facing it alone, probably constitutes the political asset that transforms the environment in his work team from a vicious circle to a virtuous circle.

In any case, the elites and the godfathers always know how to accommodate themselves to the rising sun, they never lose because they don't fight with their money.

The invisible power that turned marines into a plague constitutes the sphere from which Alejandro Armenta must guard.

In an instant the negative capacity of this force causes structural damage

Did they betray Armenta to benefit another Morenista aspirant? What awaits Morena in Puebla if he is kidnapped by these powers that be?

Puebla Levitical or Patriarchal?

 Puebla Levitical or Patriarchal?

Diego Martin Velazquez Caballero

Although the Mario Marín case left an indelible mark on Puebla's political culture, it is still terrifying to find that his strength goes beyond the political network he formed and is related to deeply rooted values in the social imaginary of Puebla. Poblano and Marinista are almost synonymous. Perhaps this is why the head of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (Semarnat), María Luisa Albores, decides not to participate in the partisan contest that formalizes MORENA's candidacy for state government.

It is true that factionalism makes political cliques sterile and volatile in an authoritarian environment such as Puebla, but marinismo is unmatched in force. It is incredible that it causes more spasms that a woman has real possibilities, also legal as an unavoidable historical adjustment, for most of the political and business class to be linked to and have collaborated with the Governor of Puebla.

Feminist progressivism is difficult to understand, but what can be done in the face of a reality of gender violence as extreme as the one in Puebla. The social indicators are there and they are the absolute truth.

The possibility of a state government headed by a woman caused a furious reaction from the media, religious, businessmen, politicians and, mainly, converted morenistas. Political turncoat in factionalism is entrepreneurship, pragmatic leadership. And, for this reason, Rafael Moreno Valle assumed that Puebla could only be governed as Avilacamachismo did, although with the same costs.

Faced with characters such as Ignacio Mier and Alejandro Armenta, most of the political, economic and social structures have been articulated that seek to remain in force in the economic exercise of the next six-year term. The possibilities of a different candidacy, due to gender, legal and legitimate issues, present a high cost not only for MORENA but also for the interests of the cliques and factions that always know how to accommodate the highest bidder, including opportunist feminism as Rubí described it. Soriano.

Authentic feminism, whatever this means, as well as Morenista purism, must carry out a demanding exercise in self-criticism. Pragmatism implies the assumption of capital sins and diabolical commitments that lead to situations of vulnerability. The alternation in Puebla has lavished meager results because it lacks authentic work and capacity. Marinism survived thanks to pragmatism, and it will persist for several more years even if conditions are not favorable, but this is the meaning of Mexican politics, to survive and not crash, as happened to Morenovallismo. The limits imposed on a character like María Luisa Albores are due to this levitical and primitive sense of local politics; she is not her person, but what she represents

Alejandro Armenta and the Morena crisis in Puebla

 Alejandro Armenta and the Morena crisis in Puebla

Diego Martin Velázquez Caballero

Even when Marinism seemed to disappear in the face of the rise of the leadership of Rafael Moreno Valle, it was preserved as a current political tendency for the triumph of Miguel Barbosa Huerta in the extraordinary elections and, probably, in the designation of a candidate as, as it seems to represent Alexander Armenta.

Alejandro Armenta saw his political career bear fruit by sticking to and defending the political group of Mario Marín, who sought to develop a career in search of the presidency of the republic. The scandal of the Lidia Cacho case exposed the structures and mechanics of an oligarchic and corrupt power that has not been able to banish itself from the state of Puebla.

The economic, social and electoral support of Marinism was singular for the support of the interim government, as well as for Morena to triumph in the elections against Enrique Cárdenas and Alejandro Armenta, as operator and architect of Mario Marín, Javier López Zavala and Valentín Meneses. , generated the consensus that made the traditional “green vote” work, which was imposed against Acción Nacional and legitimized barbosismo.

Almost immediately, Miguel Barbosa tried to distance himself from the authoritarian and corrupt vision of the Marinista group, which was already beginning to be a burden for the state government. Armenta himself starred in conflicts that revealed the dark side of Marinism to displace Barbosa from the Executive Branch. Despite this and other contemporaneous contempt for Marinism with Barbosa, it seems that Senator Armenta represents the way for Barbosismo and its social bases to build a political process capable of confronting Bartlismo and the still surviving PRIANRD coalition.

Marinism is in force in the figure of Alejandro Armenta and willing to generate a mechanics of cacique, migrant, business and PRI alliances so that the regional power of the historic priismo of Puebla is preserved. For its part, the National Regeneration party has failed to generate an efficient institutional architecture and the cost has been the storm of its internal state and national processes, as well as the lack of authentic candidates committed to the Fourth Transformation to succeed the government in power. the state of Puebla.

The scarcity of lopezobradorismo in Puebla has allowed the will and fortune of the regional chieftainships -such as Marinismo- to prevail and demonstrate their political craft against an incompetent leftist government and the local democratic transition.

Morena's conflicts in Puebla destroy the possibility of the permanence of progressivism in the entity and reveal the appetite of the opposition factions and parties to reach the governorship again. Puebla continues with an interrupted political transition and an authoritarian structure worthy of the old regime, as the aspiration of the Morenista more Marinista supposes.