The Fourth Transformation Facing Donald Trump

 The Fourth Transformation Facing Donald Trump

Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero

In the analysis of political transitions, the theory of the rupture of the dominant coalition explains how, at certain moments, the groups sustaining a regime or political system begin to splinter or weaken due to internal changes or external pressures.

In the case of Morena—the party that has concentrated power in Mexico in recent years—one can observe a process that appears to be approaching such a rupture, particularly in light of pressure and accusations regarding U.S. intervention in the country's internal affairs.

Donald Trump and, subsequently, other actors in the United States have asserted that Mexico is governed by drug trafficking and "narco-politics," a claim that has had a profound impact on the various internal factions of Morena.

For some time now, Morena has not been a homogeneous bloc; within it exist distinct currents and figures with varied interests and loyalties.

Some of these actors—considered the "softliners"—have begun seeking agreements and understandings with U.S. authorities, hoping to safeguard their positions and avoid being directly affected by external pressures.

Others—the more radical or "hardline" elements—maintain a stance of resistance, defending national sovereignty and criticizing foreign interference.

However, tension between these internal groups has intensified in recent months, creating an atmosphere of mistrust, fragmentation, and power struggles.

The situation is reminiscent, in certain respects, of what occurred in Venezuela following the U.S. and its allies' targeting of Nicolás Maduro.

In that scenario, different factions within Chavismo split between those who accepted external negotiations to maintain their standing and those who resisted and fought to preserve the regime's autonomy.

In Mexico, some Morena actors appear to be following a similar path, seeking—from within—agreements with the United States that would allow them to preserve their influence and, in some cases, distance themselves from the radicalism that they view as a threat to their political survival.

Can we speak, then, of a rupture in Morena's dominant coalition? The evidence suggests the answer is yes. The unity that once seemed solid around López Obrador and his transformation project is now under threat.

Internal factions are increasingly acting in their own self-interest and for political survival, within a landscape where external pressure has acted as a catalyst for emerging divisions.

In this context, the struggle for power in Mexico is no longer merely an internal dispute; it has become a battle where alliances are being redrawn based on who is willing and able to negotiate with the United States, and who prefers to resist and maintain a confrontational stance.

While it cannot yet be stated with certainty that the Morena coalition has definitively fractured, the signs indicate that the process is underway.

External pressure, internal fragmentation, and power struggles are creating a scenario where alliances and loyalties are becoming blurred, and the cohesion that underpinned the so-called "Fourth Transformation" is beginning to give way.

Mexico's political history—and parallels with other cases in the region—suggest that if this trend continues, Morena could face a process similar to that of Venezuela, where internal rifts and external pressures ultimately redefine the political system in ways that cannot yet be clearly foreseen.

The dispute over populism in Mexico

The dispute over populism in Mexico

Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero 

In Mexico, both the Catholic Church and the State have been key players in perpetuating clientelistic, corporatist, patrimonial, and kleptocratic practices.

The difference lies not so much in the methods they employ, but in the age and formality with which these mechanisms have become embedded in their structures.

For centuries, the Church has operated on multiple levels, articulating networks of social, cultural, and political support that, in many cases, have functioned as a kind of parallel or complementary power structure to that of the State.

Religion has been used to consolidate loyalties, sustain certain elites, and, at times, reinforce social dependency through the distribution of spiritual and material benefits.

It is not surprising that, in a country with so much poverty, the Church continues to be an actor that, at different levels, employs these same mechanisms to maintain its influence and social control.

For its part, the Mexican State, since its inception, has resorted to the same logic, only at a more institutionalized and formal level.

Clientelism, corporatism, and patrimonialism have been recurring tools in the country's political history.

Governments, regardless of their political affiliation, have distributed resources, positions, favors, and benefits in a system designed to consolidate loyalties and ensure their hold on power.

The difference with the Church lies in the fact that, on many occasions, these practices have been carried out within the framework of legality, or at least under the guise of legality, through social programs, the allocation of resources, institutional manipulation, and networks of intermediaries that guarantee territorial and social control.

Corruption, in its most basic form, has been a structural element of the relationship between elites and vulnerable communities.

What is evident is that, fundamentally, there is no substantial difference in the methods used by the Church and the State to maintain their power.

Both actors have resorted to clientelism and corporatism, only at different times and with varying degrees of formality and longevity.

While the Church has historically operated on a more social, cultural, and religious level, the State has employed these mechanisms in public administration and resource management.

However, in practice, both maintain a similar logic: the distribution of benefits in exchange for loyalties, votes, or social support, in a context where poverty and inequality are plagues that fuel this dynamic.

The central problem is that these practices reinforce a system of domination that keeps Mexican society in a state of permanent vulnerability.

Poverty, lack of opportunities, and weak economic structures make communities easy prey for these mechanisms.

Society, for the most part, lacks the tools and institutions that would allow it to demand rights or build a strong citizenry.

In this scenario, both the Church and the State operate within a system where clientelism is presented as the only way to access certain minimal benefits, thus preventing the formation of a genuine democratic culture and a civil society capable of challenging these powers.

Joy Langston and Bernardo Barranco have investigated several cases where these sociological phenomena can be observed: the clientelism of the PRI/MORENA coalition and the corruption scandals within the high clergy.

The electoral struggle, then, becomes a battle for the hegemony of clientelism, where political, religious, and social actors intertwine in a scenario where poverty and social inequalities are the main ingredients fueling this dispute.

The competition is not only for votes, but also for the ability to offer immediate benefits and promises of well-being that, in reality, perpetuate social dependency and exclusion.

From the critiques of authors such as Loris Zanatta and Mario Vargas Llosa, we can understand that populism is not just a campaign method, but a way of consolidating power based on emotional manipulation, the distribution of benefits, and the destruction of institutional checks and balances.

Clientelism in Mexico has become a structure that, beyond official rhetoric, functions as a system in which intermediaries, both from the government and the Church, maintain long-term relationships with communities, fostering a culture of dependency and weakening mechanisms for democratic participation.

As long as a large and robust middle class does not exist in Mexico, we can hardly speak of an autonomous citizenry, a strong civil society, or institutions capable of confronting these clientelistic mechanisms.

Mexico, Populism, and its Geopolitics

Mexico, Populism, and its Geopolitics

Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero

In modern Mexican history, the six-year terms of Luis Echeverría Álvarez and José López Portillo exemplify how poorly managed sovereignist populism can lead to economic and political disasters with profound consequences.

Echeverría, in particular, was an excessively pragmatic president who adopted a Bonapartist style of governance, concentrating power and acting with a personalistic and authoritarian vision.

His eagerness to assert national sovereignty and challenge foreign influence, in a context of international crisis and the exhaustion of the import substitution model, led him to decisions that deeply damaged the Mexican economy.

The nationalization of the banks, the increase in unsupported public spending, and the confrontation with the United States were symptoms of a populism that prioritized sovereignist rhetoric over the country's economic and social realities.

The result was a serious deterioration of institutions, a crisis of confidence, and soaring inflation, which marked the end of that era and laid the groundwork for a weakened economy.

The lesson of that chapter is that sovereignist populism, when it becomes a strategy of confrontation and self-sufficiency, ends up harming rather than strengthening the nation.

Misunderstood sovereignty, stifled by arrogance and authoritarianism, can cause a collapse that undermines the foundations of the state and social welfare.

Today, this same logic is being repeated in Mexican politics, which continues to risk aligning itself with populist regimes in Latin America.

The perception in the country is that, after the damage caused by governments like those of Echeverría and López Portillo, sovereignist populism is a perilous path that only brings more poverty, insecurity, and a loss of real autonomy.

These governments, with their anti-imperialist rhetoric and eagerness to challenge the United States, end up promoting a dangerous dependency and a weakening of national institutions.

The perception is that the country lives under a low-quality democracy, where elites and powerful vested interests skillfully manipulate discourses of sovereignty and nationalism to maintain their privileges. This type of populism, when combined with authoritarianism, ends up fragmenting social cohesion, perpetuating inequalities, and ultimately consolidating a system of domination that prevents the advancement of a true democracy.

The risk lies in the fact that, in their eagerness to maintain the image of a sovereign and independent state, the country becomes hostage to a discourse that, in reality, favors the elites and local bosses, who use anti-imperialist rhetoric to justify their power and privileges.

This scenario is exacerbated by the escalating violence of the cartel wars and the normalization of authoritarianism, which in Mexico has been on the rise as political and social conservatism has strengthened.

Mexico continues to face the risk of falling into a sovereignist populism that, instead of strengthening its institutional structure and economy, weakens them even further.

True sovereignty requires solid institutions, respect for human rights, and a vision that prioritizes collective well-being over confrontational rhetoric and self-sufficiency.

Only in this way can Mexico overcome the shadows of a past that, disguised as patriotism, has actually been an obstacle to its development and true independence.

Long Live Populism

 Long Live Populism

Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero

Mexican political culture, in its essence, remains clientelistic and paternalistic.

This means that many citizens still see the State as a source of resources and protection, beyond the principles of representation and democratic participation corresponding to the liberal vision.

Government management, in this framework, is based not only on the implementation of public policies, but also on the survival of marginalized groups, who find in the State and its leaders a way to subsist and maintain their living conditions.

As long as this remains the case, political power in Mexico will be able to remain stable, even in the face of criticism and serious challenges such as U.S. imperialism.

Political culture in Latin America, including Mexico, has historically been populist and caudillo-led, and a mere simulation of U.S. presidentialism.

These characteristics, far from being mere vestiges of the past, remain essential components of the functioning of populist progressive regimes in the region.

In Mexico, populism has remained thriving, adapting to the times and consolidating a system in which the figure of the charismatic leader and the direct relationship with the social base remain fundamental.

Despite the criticisms leveled at the so-called Fourth Transformation, Claudia Sheinbaum's celebration and Morena's advance in this context actually have significant meaning: in a scenario where the opposition fails to offer clear and viable alternatives, the ruling movement continues to advance because it responds to the expectations and basic needs of broad sectors of the population.

Morena's advance and the support for its leaders have a social foundation that cannot be ignored.

Mexican political culture, in its most deeply rooted form, remains sufficient to sustain a system where loyalty and the expectation of immediate benefits prevail over proposals for structural change.

The servitude and vassalage instilled by the Spanish colonial regime—as AMLO states— Although complemented by an authoritarian, indigenous-style political bossism, these are fundamental elements for populist governance.

The opposition, for its part, has yet to offer a convincing project that mobilizes these same roots, allowing populism to remain an effective form of governance in Mexico.

Donald Trump Weakens on Venezuela

 Donald Trump Weakens on Venezuela

Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero 

US geopolitics in the region is undergoing a significant shift, with characteristics reminiscent of Theodore Roosevelt's model.

Although the use of military force is presented as a strategy of psychological pressure, this form of coercive diplomacy tolerates no resistance and sends a clear message against populist governments and established powers.

While there have been no large-scale attacks like those of recent historical periods, the implicit message is forceful: the United States is not willing to allow full political, economic, and social autonomy in this region. The potential fall of the Castro-Chavista regime in Venezuela prompts reflection on the future of nationalist populism in Latin America.

It is striking to observe the fragility of populist governments in the face of US influence, as well as the lack of significant support from the BRICS countries regarding the realities facing South America.

The question arises as to whether this context could represent any political benefit for Donald Trump.

However, it should also be noted that his decisions and excesses generate discontent even among his own electorate.

In parallel, the anti-neoliberal and decolonial discourse in Latin America seems to be reconfiguring itself in the face of US military threats.

It is essential that ideas evolve toward more effective strategies to counter imperialist dynamics.

On the other hand, the process of economic integration between Mexico and the United States presents itself, by necessity, as a display of pragmatism that cannot be ignored.

Mexico, increasingly interdependent with its northern neighbor, faces the challenge of deepening this relationship to guarantee mutual benefits.

A viable path to ensuring successful integration involves fostering a liberal culture and strengthening Mexican state institutions.

The current situation in Venezuela serves as a reminder of the importance of balancing objectives and means in the region's political trajectory.

Meanwhile, the historical aspirations of the Latin American left face significant challenges.

Its structural limitations contrast sharply with the reach of U.S. power, creating a seemingly insurmountable dynamic.

Mexico's political and economic evolution is inextricably linked to the U.S. context, making it essential to closely observe developments in the United States to anticipate the future.

The internal struggles within the Mexican state have inadvertently contributed to amplifying the United States' influence and veto power in domestic affairs.

Instead of pursuing an independence that is difficult to achieve under current conditions, it is crucial to commit to balanced and responsible collaboration that benefits both parties and fosters a more constructive environment.

Although the decline of US imperialism has been extensively debated, the military mobilization in Latin America seems to contradict this perception.

However, recent events stemming from Donald Trump's actions against progressive populism in Venezuela suggest that the weakness of the United States and the lack of clarity surrounding Trumpism are more evident.

While the unilateral measures taken against vessels deemed unsafe by the United States have been significant, the survival of so-called Castro-Chavismo in Venezuela demonstrates that the landscape has not substantially changed.

At the same time, in other strategic areas of global geopolitics, the United States is retreating in the face of its adversaries and limiting the scope of its influence as a bastion of liberal capitalist democracy.

Historical critics of US imperialism, such as Noam Chomsky, predicted that the decline of the United States would inevitably come as the resources necessary to maintain such costly geopolitical control for its taxpayers were exhausted.

Today, this premise seems to be confirmed by recent US economic decisions and geopolitical strategies.

The United States appears to be incapable of guaranteeing the protection of its own national security, adopting a mercantilist approach and ceasing to invest in major projects that would expand its geopolitical presence beyond its immediate areas of competitive influence.

This reinforces the increasingly accepted idea of ​​the decline of American imperialism.

The Trump administration's strategy, for its part, is becoming increasingly ambiguous both domestically and internationally.

In this context, the multipolar scenario gains greater relevance, and it is vital that societies understand the implications of a world governed by multiple, conflicting powers seeking to replace US hegemony.

An example of this shift is Mexico, where the influence of powers like China and Russia not only persists but could grow due to the less proactive approach of the United States.

Likewise, the expansion of the BRICS bloc and the strengthening of progressive populist regimes in Latin America appear to be inevitable trends on the regional landscape.

In parallel, the decline of the United States is generating immediate concerns, especially regarding the public policies that Mexico must adopt to address challenges such as mass deportations and immigration control.

Furthermore, it will be a priority to develop strategies to offset the economic impact stemming from both potential deportations and the reliance on informal labor, which represents a key component of the country's socioeconomic structure.

Culture of Authoritarian Poverty

Culture of Authoritarian Poverty

Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero

Latin American populism, whether left or right, always ends up drawing on the culture of poverty that distinguishes the primitive social complexity produced by the economic structure.

Jaime Castrejón Diez, focusing on the analysis of the types of civilization that make up Mexican society, found that the elements of the primitive and basic social fabric were predominant in our country.

The foundation of Mexican society is primitive given its marginal economic level.

The failure of neoliberals to change the Mexican order would have logically resulted in the triumph of populism—left or right—sooner or later.

The liberal democratization of Mexico depends on the construction of a middle class, which, until now, is more a wish than a concrete reality.

The reaction of the opposition to Morena in the face of a populist wave that continues unabated in the country is ironic. What did they expect? José Antonio Aguilar Rivera—like Loris Zanatta—has described the enormous difficulties that liberal culture faces in Latin America due to the social and historical context.

Indeed, the liberal commitment—high civilization—suddenly appears to be a lost adventure in Mexico.

Foolish republics become eternal and multiplying.

However, the bill for civilizational failure must be imposed not only on society but primarily on its elites.

This regression not only condemns us to backwardness and poverty in political evolution, but also to a series of problems that will complicate governability: caracoles are slow but impetuous.

Carlos Salinas had to make twice as many authoritarian decisions as Lázaro Cárdenas is credited with in order to achieve neoliberal modernization. Fox lacked the courage to cut the umbilical cord with the PRI, and Calderón led the country into a war that had been corrupted and negotiated as a defeat since Los Pinos.

The authoritarian poverty of the elites is worse than that of society.

The social primitivism of the people that terrifies Zanatta and Aguilar Rivera—as it did with Tocqueville—is less than the part that concerns the elites.

Mobilizing National Populism in Latin America

 Mobilizing National Populism in Latin America

Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero

According to Menno Vellinga, the Latin American state had one of its most accurate projects for change and diagnoses when the letters of intent and the Washington Consensus established the economic, political, and social measures to carry out modernization and institutionalization processes. However, the technocratic vision was disrupted by a political class that sabotaged the processes of change and decided to regain patrimonialist inertia. Like Guillermo O'Donnell, he pointed out that the best model for Latin America was represented by Technocratic-Military Bureaucracy linked to Delegative Democracies, a weak situation for the consolidation of democracy in Latin America and economic growth; however, it was a starting point of no return for the establishment of a state from a Weberian and Constitutionalist perspective. It is true that this implied open-heart surgery without anesthesia; However, this is the prescription for a social order where the State does not have hegemony but rather relative autonomy from various groups and de facto powers.

However, for Vellinga, as well as for the Argentine scholar, historical inertia and cultural variables are stronger than state capacity, and therefore, Weak, Failed, or Facade States controlled by strong, motley, multi-cultural, authoritarian societies characteristic of the Habsburg Model prevail. The fact is that clientelist, populist, and social movement phenomena pose situations of ungovernability for the State, which ends up being held hostage by the bourgeoisie, oligarchies, or the ruling elites of social movements.

What is not fully understood in Latin America is that for the emergence of the State, it is essential to end the Habsburg Model as a social order. This configuration was a clientelist and corporatist arrangement developed since the colonial era with the preeminence of the Catholic Church, but it implies vulnerability to the processes of globalization and geopolitical competition, such as what is currently being experienced.

Under progressive governments, the state's presence is also not consolidated; activist and militant bureaucracy reveals the extreme weakness of the institutional order. The left in government promotes social mobilization as a spontaneous input for public policies, even though this means naively betting on an imaginary effective capacity. Social mobilization will not stop Donald Trump or the economic agenda imposed by the White House on our country.

The North American relationship with Mexico has taken a roller coaster course that demands a functioning state in our country. The lack of cohesion within Morena and, above all, respect for the directives of the Presidency of the Republic will end up undermining governability in the country and inciting Trumpism to develop more interventionist actions. The enormous gap between the activism of Morena officials and their concrete results demonstrates how important it is to take the task of governing seriously.

Lula's triumph in Brazil

 Lula's triumph in Brazil

Diego Martin Velazquez Caballero

Although the difference between Lula and Bolsonaro is not like that of 2006 between the left and the right in Mexico, an important fracture is beginning to appear in Brazil that affects our country and Latin America. Although the victory of the Brazilian left tries to get into the sack of populism, this is not the case; It is important to remember the technologies and spaces for collective action, including the geopolitical actions that the Latin American giant implemented as a hopeful and different model of what Heinz Dieterich proposed as the socialism of the 21st century.

It is particularly worth remembering the technology of participatory budgets and the ideas of sociologists Leonardo Avritzer and Boaventura Do Santos. The alternation in the country where the most beautiful soccer in the world is played brings back pleasant memories of the debates in the doctorate of history and regional studies at the Institute of Historical-Social Research of the Veracruzana University. Is it participatory civil society, social movements taking power, populism or new government?

We do not know, even when the influence of Liberation Theology is also delimited in the influences of someone who represents one of the most important leaders in Brazilian history. The governments of the Labor Party were successful by generating technologies of participation and collective action different from a centralized government that pretends to be right in everything because good intentions and ethical conditions are on its side. There is also the negative side of the trajectory of the Brazilian participatory model, the corruption derived from neo-extractivism and the deadly economy of commodities that various governments of the continent promoted to survive against the market and Yankee imperialism.

The change in Brazil is an impact on the geopolitical condition of the continent, the North American carelessness will cause the development of the BRIC and Mercosur, to the horror of the liberal right and political science. Thinking from the south makes sense now more than ever. Simón Bolívar will never be like George Washington, just as the Mexican constitution of 1824 will never work for a country like ours because there are no gringos here, there are Mexicans.

The triumph of Luis Ignacio Lula Da Silva invites us to reflect critically on civil society and acquire the courage to build it seriously, not through the farce of conservative businessmen and religious who kidnap it. And also, to think about geopolitical strategies to develop a defense against the United States that increasingly resembles the Aztecs that Hernán Cortés found.

The best of luck to the South American brother who influences so much good in Latin America.

Donald Trump and the New World Order

Donald Trump and the New World Order

July 9, 2020

Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero

https://www.semanarioelreto.com/single-post/2020/07/09/Donald-Trump-y-el-Nuevo-Orden-Mundial?fbclid=IwAR3v---zRFQwxr3LGOKHictiwYUESd5zXdTjjn9i3rdxRxKMPlvRQ6TbX08

The coronavirus has generated a crisis situation in all areas. The scenario may have been provoked or spontaneous, but the consequences will deeply affect the present generations. The isolation that humanity lives contained a series of conflicts and social demands that marginalized and youth groups, all over the world, were beginning to shape. In North America, social mobilizations are on the brink of total conflict.

The current scenario is similar to the beginning of the 20th century. Technology, westernization and markets maintained a buoyant position, however, all these advances caused a century of wars and geopolitical repositioning. The 21st century seemed the end of history, once again there was talk of western and technological triumphs that made all human beings equal, however, this situation - and the conflicts of the last century - have not been able to solve the problems of poverty and generational dynamically increasing. The XX and XXI centuries have in common the rebellion of the masses (José Ortega y Gasset). Some consider that the 1968 virus has consolidated. For others, there is an alienation of which we are not yet aware but which will lead to social decomposition. Thus, a more dynamic and unstable generational change is observed. The generation of 1968 criticized the social order and the slowness that the gerontocracy of the time represented. It was an important call of the "crisis of modernity", a phenomenon that has not stopped and that increases over time.

In the past, the order was concentrated in several periods and remained a good number of years. Now, changes, thanks to technology and the free flow of information, are faster and displaces forms, they are just beginning to be structured. The media and social networks transmit a series of information and values ​​that break the paradigms of social control, it has always been so. The fashions are opposite to the status quo and come from elements that are always the crumbs of the elites.

There is a deep rebellion of the masses, the problem lies in understanding if it will be of the magnitude of the early twentieth century. The rebellion of the masses in this environment caused communism and, in reaction to it, the European fascisms. Both phenomena generated the totalitarianisms that made that period a prolonged period of violence. The rebellion of the masses ended the civilization project of European liberalism and allowed the consolidation of North American imperialism, perhaps now the experience is repeated, will it continue as the superpower of the United States? The world problem continues to be the distribution of wealth, the formation of a minimal welfare state and a broad middle class that legitimizes the authoritative instructions of the political system. If the State disappears, society disappears. Measures to generate mixed economies and a large world middle class can no longer be prolonged.

The humanitarian crisis caused by COVID19 constitutes an advanced euthanasia that raises a series of problems that run down the path of technology and generational change. What types of human beings are going to stay? What environment awaits the next generations? Will humanity survive? Answering these questions is difficult. Inertia, the laboratory of history, tells us that - sooner or later - the elements of violent human nature tend to prevail, the demon of all times prays: man will always be the same and again he will destroy himself because he all he knows how to do is fight.

In this context, the link between Mexico and the United States implies coordination of survival in the face of scenarios such as COVID19 and, surely, more serious and worse, of continuing with the neoliberal economic model promoted by the New World Order.

One of the issues to link Trump to Mexico is immigration. That is where the importance of the United States to Mexico can be understood. You have to realize how many compatriots send their remittances to rural communities so that they survive. Governments are concentrated in the cities and forget about the places where migrants are expelled, that is, those communities in which the difficult social, economic and even political situation forces them to leave and remain outside their community for several years (Puebla is one of the most representative states for the removal of immigrants to the United States. In all governments, with the exception of Melquiades Morales and Mario Marín, attention to the future of migrants has been minimal, if not null).

It should be understood that the vulnerable situation of a country like Mexico is an indication that it cannot be negotiated with great advantage, that is, it is expected that the issues of migration, drug trafficking, economy and security are beneficial for Mexicans; But, as the saying goes, the United States has interests, not friends, and that is why Donald Trump's relationship with López Obrador is convenient for the Republican Party and nothing else.

Even though our nation has managed to emancipate itself for two hundred years, the truth is that it has not been able to construct a socio-political scheme to inhibit falling under the tutelage of Anglo-Saxon imperialism. It is true that, as historically defined spaces, the comparative advantages were favorable for Ibero-America compared to what is currently known as the United States of America. What was the difference of the routes? The utility and presentation of the modern project. The modern vision of the Nation-State allowed North America to build an expansionist society and perspective from the beginning of its independence. The secular religion of North America was imperialism.

Iberoamerica, on the contrary, always had - and has - an anti-modern vision, its trajectory and context, inhibited any other option other than Catholic nationalism.

Mexico, in particular, was the laboratory for American expansionism and, once American empowerment began, the position of the United States became unattainable. Mexico has had to add to the traditional Hispanic-Catholic dominance, the colonialism imposed by North America. Mexico has not had, nor does it have, the possibility of making geopolitical alliances with Asian, European, African countries or any international organization; On the contrary, the geopolitical processes of the 20th century consolidated the United States as a superpower and Mexico as a fundamental part of its National Security structure.

That Mexico does better when Republicans govern the United States, there is no doubt. The situation of control and national security that characterizes them, causes attention to be paid, much attention, in our country. On the other hand, the ambiguous ideas of the Democrats provoke a neglect that increases the national problem. Donald Trump and AMLO agree on the rejection of the New World Order, the model that the United States implemented in the wake of the Cold War and which has now come to an end. The concept of "Brexit" is a sign that globalization is no longer in control and there are irresponsible people who are going to lead society to disaster, humanity to extinction.

Drunkenness was neoliberalism and Samuel Huntington warned it in his works, Zbigniew Brzezinski's geopolitical model has caused many social problems and, really, the United States has to wonder what is worth more to them, the collapse of the Berlin Wall or the collapse of the Twin Towers of the WTC. Brzezinski posed the dilemma between controlling the world as a superpolice or exercising moral leadership, US imperialism will have to choose because both are impossible. North America became the murderer of an invisible, economic, and trans-territorial power that mixes the world's main economic elites and the organized crime of the most extreme anarchism. Liberalism is twinned with anarchism and, therefore, causes conflicts as serious as those that characterized the 20th century. Totalitarianisms were the consequence of uncontrolled economic liberalism that overcame the political values ​​of government institutions. Hence, the conflict situations that are lived now, present this situation of chaos and disorder. Transgression must be evolutionary, but economic liberalism is involuntary, even if it tries to observe methodological rationalism, what it does is expose the legitimacy of the most violent principles of mankind.

The health contingency is deepening the gap between generations, technology, knowledge and values. The situation has generated a profound change derived from technology and, now, it is confirmed that this is imminent. It is not a question of expressing that the new generations are better in the handling of technologies, this is a truth of Perogrullo, but that the technological availability will pigeonhole the future progenies in the devices and social networks because the world problems require a parenthesis and suspension of the economy, perhaps we are in the presence of the definitive transition from neoliberalism to neo-extractivism. The combative and bourgeois attitude of the new generations comes from a demand to increase the power of the market, but reality does not allow this to be constituted, all generations have had to learn from reality and these will not be the exception: the environment and the existence of people is in deep trouble.

Hence, even when new social movements have that capacity to be divergent, reality has no regard for anyone. The prospects for some is that technology is not always friendly and has consequences.

Education, paideia, as before and always, seeks to change this human nature and, despite all the negative judgments towards teaching and school, it is necessary to find models that achieve that generous change in humanity. Rifkin and Marina, constitute a way of understanding the poles in the role of the school facing this situation: the debate between strong and weak thinking. What is strong thinking and weak thinking? Strong thinking is represented by ethics, responsibility, even conservative vision. Weak thinking is anarchist, existential nihilist. Strong thinking involves goals, competitiveness, and resilience. The fort is related to realism and the physical, material and geographical conditions of life. The second is based on idealism, utopias and alternative forms. On the other hand, there are also those who believe that something can still be changed and that, although this is a qualified form of weak thinking, it is values, leadership, and feelings that will always help us get ahead. The secret is to unite these perspectives and avoid the pessimism and idealism that can be generated from one or the other.

Technology allows new generations to access information more quickly. With this, the structures are broken immediately and tribes and social roles that were not contemplated appear. Empathy will be that tool that will allow them to face that reality that is unknown.

Fractured Populism

Fractured Populism

By Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero

https://infoquorum.com/notas/2019/09/18/Opini%C3%B3n/Populismo_Fracturado

The concession to the Mexican extreme right to be in charge of the Board of Directors in the Legislative Power, is one of the facts that adds to the serious contradictions that 4T has at national, state and local level. Even when it is affirmed that we are facing the construction of a new regime, the truth is that it is about renewing the old government of the institutionalized revolution. The change without breaking Manuel Camacho Solís.

The party system in Mexico was shattered by transfuguism, neoliberal corruption and ungovernability. Most of the political institutes were left speechless and with a dormant dormant force in the face of the overwhelming magnitude of the electoral trend that National Regeneration obtained. Despite the millions of votes that PAN and PRI achieved, said electorate has not been mobilized or activated by the antílopez.

Morena is not in better conditions, more than a perredización, the political institute is a victim of the styles and invoices that the different alliances implied. Hence, when factionalism is demonstrated because pure radicals or morenists demand quotas of power and coherence of government style, the charismatic leader imposes his verdicts to maintain a balance that is increasingly unstable.

Andrés Manuel has declared that he will renounce Morena if she is perverted, that is, like Benito Mussolini, renounce Fascism and choose Italy if circumstances demand it. Therefore, Mussolini is considered a failed fascism, a frustrated leader; despite the authoritarianism of the Duce, his project was an operetta because it was not structured or organized despite the strength and legitimacy it had achieved. This fault is used as a subterfuge of rights to distinguish between fascism and Nazism, although, in general, conservative rights lack real progressive projects and platforms.

To relieve Mexican liberals and anti-communists, this fact demonstrates that 4T is not meant to be a Bolivarian or Castro revolution. The disenchantment of a revolutionary, progressive and liberal left is already becoming more and more evident. Andrés Manuel is unlikely to end up as Benito Mussolini; But, it is certain that, if there is no project or perspective, José López Portillo's tears become plausible, as well as the economic and social disaster that no nationalist discourse alleviates.

Andrés Manuel intends to institutionalize the National Regeneration Movement as Manuel Ávila Camacho institutionalized the government of the Mexican revolution, giving rise to divergent political factions that assimilate the moderation and pragmatism that the Hegemonic Party meant. Just as AMLO intervened so that the extreme right had an important lecture to contradict and even subvert the 4T nation project, Manuel Ávila Camacho admitted sinarquistas and cristeros in the PRI, a party that was even infiltrated by the Tecos and Yunques before bread. Thus, the PRI became the Sun Party with its right hand and its sinister which alternated according to a high-political pact with North America and the Holy See.

It is not surprising that Morena as before the PAN and, much earlier, the PRI; submitted to the decisions of the Executive. The perfect square binomial Official Party-Government, as well as the caciquismo, is immeasurable in our political culture. A nationalist government is prohibited by imperialist hegemony, but society is hardly going to support the permanence of the informal narcocorporativist regime led by poor pathologists and pseudoneoliberals.

If 4Q is heading towards a failed populism, it will be necessary to understand catpardism as a permanent and disenchanting variable of the failed Mexican democracy. The extreme right has made significant progress despite being "morally defeated," as has happened with factions and groups antagonistic to the MORENA project. The technocratic circles consider that if AMLO is recycling, it implies that it has awakened to the tasks of governance. The progressive groups begin to notice, instead, that AMLO, like Mussolini and José López Portillo, is going to spread many of the proposals and policies that are indispensable, will not risk taking the necessary steps and measures to defend the sovereignty of Mexico .

The arrival of the extreme right to the spaces of Morena, are not pacts of governance but dangerous contubernios of which few figures left clean. For some, politics is that, getting your hands dirty for others. Is it worth it for the historical significance of 4Q? In the federal, state and municipal administration, the concessions made to Catholic nationalism are the constant. Chambismo think some, infiltration say others; leadership, they think. AMLO cannot do what Calles and Cárdenas in three years and, to these, the US and the Holy See ended up canceling them.

Revolutionary conservatism is an illusion, the journey of a regime transformation implies breaking with the inertia of the Mexican political system.

Little by little, we begin to feel that failed democracy is the process of political modernization in our country. If the President's appendix is ​​not Morena, anyone else can serve, RSP, Servant of the Nation, Green Party or even Future 21.

Canovism is the art of governing Mexico. But the ghost of José López Portillo, the Mexican Quetzalcoatl, is increasingly present. It should not be forgotten that the right and the banking system, like the pillos of the story about the naked King, were the ones who drove one of the most educated presidents in the country crazy. To ignore the Sirens, resist the oligarchies and raise real scenarios against the United States, are essential elements to break the authoritarian democracy of our society.

A failed democracy lacks governability and the model of failed populism although it reassures the Holy Mexican Civil Society and the liberal proyanquis, every day generates a disorder that someone must pay: the development of Mexico, the middle class and the South of the United States .

We'll see where the Mexican Mussolini ends.