Showing posts with label Faccionalismo. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Faccionalismo. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 18, 2026

The Fourth Transformation Facing Donald Trump

 The Fourth Transformation Facing Donald Trump

Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero




In the analysis of political transitions, the theory of the rupture of the dominant coalition explains how, at certain moments, the groups sustaining a regime or political system begin to splinter or weaken due to internal changes or external pressures.


In the case of Morena—the party that has concentrated power in Mexico in recent years—one can observe a process that appears to be approaching such a rupture, particularly in light of pressure and accusations regarding U.S. intervention in the country's internal affairs.


Donald Trump and, subsequently, other actors in the United States have asserted that Mexico is governed by drug trafficking and "narco-politics," a claim that has had a profound impact on the various internal factions of Morena.


For some time now, Morena has not been a homogeneous bloc; within it exist distinct currents and figures with varied interests and loyalties.


Some of these actors—considered the "softliners"—have begun seeking agreements and understandings with U.S. authorities, hoping to safeguard their positions and avoid being directly affected by external pressures.


Others—the more radical or "hardline" elements—maintain a stance of resistance, defending national sovereignty and criticizing foreign interference.


However, tension between these internal groups has intensified in recent months, creating an atmosphere of mistrust, fragmentation, and power struggles.


The situation is reminiscent, in certain respects, of what occurred in Venezuela following the U.S. and its allies' targeting of Nicolás Maduro.


In that scenario, different factions within Chavismo split between those who accepted external negotiations to maintain their standing and those who resisted and fought to preserve the regime's autonomy.


In Mexico, some Morena actors appear to be following a similar path, seeking—from within—agreements with the United States that would allow them to preserve their influence and, in some cases, distance themselves from the radicalism that they view as a threat to their political survival.


Can we speak, then, of a rupture in Morena's dominant coalition? The evidence suggests the answer is yes. The unity that once seemed solid around López Obrador and his transformation project is now under threat.


Internal factions are increasingly acting in their own self-interest and for political survival, within a landscape where external pressure has acted as a catalyst for emerging divisions.


In this context, the struggle for power in Mexico is no longer merely an internal dispute; it has become a battle where alliances are being redrawn based on who is willing and able to negotiate with the United States, and who prefers to resist and maintain a confrontational stance.


While it cannot yet be stated with certainty that the Morena coalition has definitively fractured, the signs indicate that the process is underway.


External pressure, internal fragmentation, and power struggles are creating a scenario where alliances and loyalties are becoming blurred, and the cohesion that underpinned the so-called "Fourth Transformation" is beginning to give way.


Mexico's political history—and parallels with other cases in the region—suggest that if this trend continues, Morena could face a process similar to that of Venezuela, where internal rifts and external pressures ultimately redefine the political system in ways that cannot yet be clearly foreseen.

Wednesday, January 07, 2026

Internal Party Discipline

 Internal Party Discipline

Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero




Morena's internal dynamics close the year with a clear struggle between its various factions, openly defying presidential directives that advocate against reelection, nepotism, and cronyism, and promote internal democracy.


Several groups within the party are sending clear signals that they are willing to compete from within, against, or outside of Morena.


This reflects the reality of a party with great political power and the ability to mobilize support, but which lacks solid internal mechanisms to manage competition and guarantee discipline.


Something similar occurred during the decline of the hegemonic PRI, when internal divisions transformed its main strengths into its greatest weakness.


Morena's internal struggle, in the lead-up to the upcoming local and federal elections, is a clear example of what political analysts call the breakdown of the dominant coalition.


Barring an extraordinary event, such as Donald Trump deciding to interfere in the nominations, internal divisions within the party are practically inevitable.


Daniel Cosío Villegas once declared that the PRI could only be defeated by the PRI itself, and it seems this maxim is now being applied to Morena.


Although the electoral and judicial institutions lack the autonomy they boasted in recent years, the division among the various internal factions foreshadows a fierce battle for control of the nominations.


In this context, polls or the legal challenges to the processes seem insignificant compared to the intensity of this competition.


Meanwhile, the opposition parties remain vigilant regarding Morena's internal fractures, seeking to exploit them by poaching or strategically recruiting candidates with greater potential.


This has unleashed a wave of political defection, party migrations, and fierce competition among the different groups within the movement.


The country has failed to consolidate an institutionalized, balanced, and pluralistic party system.


Factionalism within the ruling party continues to dictate the course of crucial issues such as the alternation of power, democratization, public policy development, and even a possible shift toward conservative positions.


On the other hand, while arrangements for the presidential succession are already focused on 2030, the aspirants and their political allies are positioning themselves well in advance.


This means that the legislative majority will have neither the strength nor the weakness that Claudia Sheinbaum currently anticipates.

Wednesday, November 29, 2023

Morena: a model of collaborative factionalism

Morena: a model of collaborative factionalism

Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero



Morena's electoral profitability seems to have no competition. The point is that collaborative factionalism does not mean homogeneity of public policies and ideological principles.

Morena's electoral profitability seems to have no competition.

There will not be a political party like the PRI again in Mexico.

Within the studies that tried to understand the prevailing logic of cohesion and discipline in the PRI that strengthened the Hegemonic Party model, political scientist Joy Langston can be located.


Is it budgetary or presidential power that incentivizes cliques to cooperate? What allows a party to develop the classification of participation under the principle: “within the system everything, even impunity; outside the system, ostracism, repression and death”? The CIDE professor considered that the control of public administration at all levels imposed the availability of jobs and patrimonialism that showed the rationality of remaining in a political monopoly and avoiding confrontation.


The idea is correct in several ways; However, with the need for economic openness and adaptability to the contexts generated by globalization, collaborative factionalism was exhausted.


Closed authoritarian models came to an end when the United States won the Cold War, open societies were the neoliberal axis of Western globalization.

The crisis of liberal democracy has allowed the return of collaborative factionalism and the possibility of authoritarianism.


It is true that Mexico has not managed to transition to an open society and that the obstacles of its political culture persist as an adaptive and functional colonialism to North American imperialism; Therefore, the convergence of multiple actors in Morena resembles the wild card device that the PRI meant.


Our country constitutes a tributary state of the United States and the toll grants licenses of all kinds to the ruling class.


The possibility that Morena will be established with the triumph of the presidency, governorships and various legislative and municipal executive spaces, has summoned partisan immigration in a high and significant proportion.


Neither the PRI nor the PAN caused partisan ruptures and abandonments in the post-Zedillism presidential experiences as National Regeneration is doing now.


Morena's electoral profitability seems to have no competition.

The point is that collaborative factionalism does not mean homogeneity of public policies and ideological principles.


The PRI empowered a political clique dedicated to political espionage because there was no other way to exercise control and discipline.


The secret police of the traditional Mexican political system ended up being disloyal to the institutions of the national state and subordinated itself to North American interests.


The route of electoral profitability and pragmatism is the shortest path for Morena to end up being the icing on the cake PRI.


  National does not have corporations, bases or structure to confront the political operators of the chiefs and turncoat politicians who now cry crocodile tears over the social issue.


What guarantees loyalty and discipline to the next president of Mexico when these feudal barons are governors?


Morena's progressivism and left seem to have established themselves only in CDMX, with notable risks in the face of a hostile environment of electoral realignment.


The pure Morenistas outside the country's capital have been marginalized and even persecuted by the regional chiefs who managed to acquire the candidacies for the state executive.


More than a scenario of divided government, there is a regime of ungovernability and blockade of the federation, Morena must abandon its progressive and nationalist agenda to converge with regional interests that have always been conservative and oligarchic.


There will not be a political party like the PRI again in Mexico.

The analysis of the time variable allows us to understand that Morena does not have the organizational or political capacity that the Official Party achieved.


It is positive that AMLO does not behave as did General Plutarco Elías Calles or General Lázaro Cárdenas, the problem lies in the fact that the regions continue to be governed by Maximino Ávila Camacho and Gonzalo N. Santos now with greater power, violence, cynicism and impunity .


The decomposition of the Mexican political system only promoted federalism to which Morena seems to pay vassalage and govern it.


Rather than collaborative factionalism, National Regeneration employs collaborative and circumstantial chiefdom to manage a transition that is being conducted without meaning.

Tuesday, April 02, 2019

Factionalism and the political crisis in Puebla

Factionalism and the political crisis in Puebla
March 29, 2019



https://www.semanarioelreto.com/single-post/2019/03/29/El-faccionalismo-y-la-crisis-pol%C3%ADtica-en-Puebla


Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero



The entity can not leave an area of ​​uncertainty that throws negative frames and deeply hurt the future. It's been several months, maybe it's been years, where the state government walks by inertia and nobody seems to attend to the urgent problems. There is a dark caciquism that prevents the resonance of democracy and freedom throughout the region. Inclusive, Puebla begins to take levels of violence that indicate a decomposition similar to the zones controlled by the organized delinquency.

Why the paralysis and loss of political life in the state? One of the answers could be found in the political factionalism that has characterized the entity throughout the twentieth century and that has not allowed the institutionalization of a true party system.

Puebla went from a collaborative factionalism that concentrated on the PRI to a competitive factionalism represented by pragmatic alliance with the PRI, against the PRI and despite the PRI. However, the PRI did not institutionalize a true militancy that projected an authentic governmental platform, it was the crucible of several cliques, caciques and wealthy families that kidnapped the public administration. Now, these cliques were imported by other political parties and have a complicated dispute over power. Factionalism is distinguished by dirty war, transfiguism, disloyalty, violence and opportunism.

Political devolution was not a historical break. The PAN governments in Puebla were the most PRI in recent times. The competition generated in this way, involuted the political practices, behaviors and proposals. You do not live a low quality of democracy, you live a policy of abuse and imposition of the strongest.

Although the political fronts maintain that they constitute alternative options to each other, the certain thing is that they have more similarities than they think, hopefully that it facilitated the government; however, it only serves to raise the level of conflict and violence. Everyone wants power for power.

No clique can deny their belonging to the avilacamachismo. In the origin, or during the political development, said lineage marks to the right, the center and the left. The PAN adds to its participation the closeness with Yankee imperialism. The PRI aims to restore the strength of the regional chiefdoms and MORENA feeds on defectors while the love of the presidential figure persists; He has also paid his fee for admitting all kinds of policies.

The avilacamachismo constitutes a reactionary modernity from which Puebla can not escape. It is more than indispensable a true alternation that has the objective of modifying the structural conditions of authoritarianism in the entity. However, the option is contradictory and the hindrances of the poblano factionalism are not willing to allow liberation and progress.

Each society has the government it deserves, Puebla does not know what government has been granted for several months. Hopefully, political parties and candidates will be able to change the political life of the entity; likewise, that society is demanding of the political class and takes responsibility for its destiny.