October Ends, and Sheinbaum Remains
Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero
To what extent is U.S. pressure shaping security decisions, creating dependencies, and altering the future of the Mexican political system? The hypothesis that Washington prefers to exert leverage over the national government—rather than seek its replacement—is a plausible strategic interpretation; it is even possible that, following November, the United States may develop specific preferences regarding the presidential succession.
The Republican Party’s hardline strategy toward Mexico suggests not only that Washington wishes to weaken the Morena-led government, but also that the White House seeks cooperation, predictability, and the ability to exert influence in service of its own strategic interests.
Venezuela offers a significant point of contrast. The U.S. operation in January 2026 that led to the capture of Nicolás Maduro demonstrated the lengths to which Washington’s coercion could go when its leaders deemed that security and geopolitical objectives justified direct intervention. However, applying that precedent to Mexico in a mechanical fashion would be a mistake. Economic integration, a shared border, and deep-rooted social ties between the two nations make the costs of destabilizing Mexico prohibitively high. The notion of such an intervention belongs firmly in the realm of sensationalist, alarmist political theater.
Trump has leveraged commercial, psychological, and social pressure—along with the threat of more aggressive security measures—to extract concessions. In response, Sheinbaum has established coordination mechanisms that include intelligence sharing, efforts to combat arms trafficking, and operations against criminal organizations. The result is a relationship in which coercion and negotiation are not necessarily mutually exclusive; rather, they can function as complementary tools to influence a government’s behavior without incurring the economic and political costs of a total rupture.
The United States has opted to keep Morena in power because it finds advantages in dealing with authorities capable of ensuring operational cooperation, institutional stability, and economic continuity. A government that is politically distinct from the one preferred by certain U.S. sectors can still prove functional, provided it delivers on specific strategic objectives. The early endorsement by the PVEM (Ecologist Green Party of Mexico) of Omar García Harfuch—whose position at the helm of public security makes him a key figure in the bilateral relationship—opens the debate over Mexico’s political succession within the framework of U.S. geopolitical strategy. The United States does not always need to exercise direct control over its interlocutors; often, it suffices to establish incentives, increase the costs of certain decisions, and expand its capacity for influence.
Ultimately, the "Fourth Transformation" is leading Mexico to see its own reflection in the mirror of Delcy Rodríguez. Which form of collaborationism will prove more burdensome for the Mexican people: the populist version or the neoliberal one?
The history of Mexico’s political system demonstrates that the country will always exist in the shadow of the superpower, as Soledad Loaeza points out. For this reason, the United States should bear in mind that a fire—or neglect—in its "backyard" could easily spread to set the house itself ablaze.






