The axis of the Puebla political debate
Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero
For some Morena Marxists, the caciquil chapulinism represented in the imposition of candidates is preferable to the right's advancement; the conservative groups are more dangerous than the caciquil fiefdoms for the Fourth Transformation to achieve its second floor. Be?
The neoliberal project, Foxism and Peñanietism tried to come to an agreement with the caciquil fiefdoms and that was how they succeeded. Manuel Camacho Solís, although he accused an excess of pragmatism in the national political class, had a practical perspective based on the experience of revolutionary nationalists in Asia; but, after the Salinist failure, he resumed it with moderation and ended up defending the pacts - at a disadvantage - with the traditional fiefdoms to balance different groups, cliques and leaders. His political strategy, both combative and centrist, was a total failure. The compact group that was imposed on the fiefdoms through the surprise strategy did not work, nor does change without rupture work.
True revolutionary transformation cannot be deceived. Constitutionalism, for example, could not take control of the country until the revolutionary Thermidor was finished. Only after the extreme radicalization of the Carrancista Grupo Sonora, the regime of the Mexican revolution was able to build institutions such as the Party, Presidentialism and Revolutionary Family that would channel the State and social justice. After its exhaustion, the Mexican political system has been intervened and at the full disposal of the United States and any other imperialism.
During the time of the Hegemonic Party, the PRI included the caciques, although it energized their circulation through a healthy political alternation and demobilization; The PRI was a caciquil, although it destroyed and controlled the caciques of many regions. The Great Chief was the president, but even the head of the Executive Branch had limited power: the six-year term. And there was no divine faculty that generated transexenality.
This was the circularity of the elites and the collaborative factionalism of the PRI until the exhaustion of the political project, as well as the social fabric. The inability of the political system to regenerate caused the chiefs and their factions to weaken the party and society. Neoliberalism and democracy were not consolidated because they lacked the strength to regulate and control chiefdom, fiefdoms and invisible power. Will the fourth transformation be the final chapter of this long transition via competitive elections?
Preferring fiefdoms to authentic disputes with the right is nothing other than rejecting the impulse for transformation and preferring gatopardismo to perpetuate the patrimonialism of Hispanic Feudalism, the Habsburg Model. What does it mean to agree with the fiefdoms? Dosage the poison of quietism, fill with the aroma of flowers in the poison of conservatism. Doesn't university Marxism have the intellectual preparation to realize that the caciques are extremely conservative?
Now, the fiefdoms represent the drug trafficking of the main global kingpin: NarcoAmérica.
Mexico became a State in Crisis since the arrival of neoliberalism and has reached the extreme. If the Fourth Transformation does not decide to promote institutional values, it will lead to the maximum risk of collapse of the political system.
Caciquismo has been the great hindrance of Ibero-American culture, the caciques are the ayatollahs of the anti-modern black revolution. They do not represent anything, neither regions, nor classes, nor identities, they are abusive and criminal personalist leaders.
The caciques were the first line of struggle that Falangism and Pinochetism had, they are the cracks and embers of fascism. They have the strength to generate civil animosity, a regional war, thanks to their clientelism and form of autonomous regional dominance. Salvador Allende was overthrown because the expectation of a successful socialist government could have radiated to the southern cone and generated a Latin American chain effect. The Pinochet dictatorship was a wedge to divide the region and weaken communist influence. In the end they got it. In any case, the left was displaced and destroyed. The left is denied in North American geopolitics, it is only a matter of time to exclude it from the political system.
The caciques are evidence of that empiricism that Manuel Camacho Solís questioned and that was causing so much damage in the country. The fiefdoms, like pillars of salt, seek to freeze time and the society they have hijacked. They represent the foundations of the most primitive authoritarianism. Supporting the Fourth Transformation in the chiefs is condemning the country to backwardness and the barbaric structure of slavery, vassalage and servitude. The alliance with the fiefdoms benefits the traditional right, which does not want time to move forward either.
Morena and her caciquil alliance have this perspective of suspending Mexican time, once again, weakening state institutionalization and centralization for the benefit of the caciques through the great electoral exchange. Again, we will be late to the story. The only thing that is institutionalized is patrimonial corruption.
The chiefs are the promoters of black revolutions to maintain the permanent backwardness of imperialist colonialism. Thus North American geopolitics is imposed on us anyway.
Andrew Paxman, returning to some assumptions of the Camachista diagnosis, proposes the chiefdom as a historical knot that limits the democratic evolution of the Mexican political system; the conflict they cause can lead to social collapse as was about to occur during the Peñanietismo. Feudalism is the new term to define this reality that was established after the failed Calderonista war, the country was put in the hands of drug trafficking and there is no way out.
The political system that the neoliberals tried to found could never defeat the fiefdoms and, later, could never summon them to a national pact for the democratic transition. In the end, the big losers were the technocrats and neoliberals. They never had the legitimizing capacity of capitalist liberal democracy and, little by little, they lost American support. The only element that controls the fiefdoms in the Mexican political system is the United States and it will continue that way.
The Fiefs expire again and system modernization comes to a prolonged halt. The Mexican political system will hardly move towards a socialist dimension, nor is prolonged party dominance in sight as in the time of the PRI. However, the fiefdoms are going to transmit power through a pragmatic canovism.
During the interventions of the candidates for the governorship of Puebla: Eduardo Rivera, for the Prianrd; Alejandro Armenta, for Morena and Fernando Morales, for Movimiento Ciudadano; All the candidates were reviled for their ties to Marinism. However, the expression is closer to the Morena candidate since, since the strange triumph of Miguel Barbosa, the Marinista operators were important for the movement of electoral structures.
According to the narrative of democratic transitions, it is not normal for Marinismo to have the possibility of resurfacing and reaching power; However, in spaces where political fiefdoms dominate municipal power and public administration, they control the succession. From this it is understood that groups that promoted Morenovallismo are found as collaborators of the second floor of the Marinista movement.
There is no political clique that achieves power unequivocally in the Puebla entity. Before the political alternation that brought the PAN to the state governorship, in reality the PRI and its cliques controlled power, as they continue to do now.
There is a shift from local power groups towards the National Regeneration Movement, from the fiefdoms that have distinguished the historical trajectory in Puebla. Traditional groups, fiefdoms, nodes and chiefdoms, execute collaborative factionalism to retain control of the entity. Those groups or characters that do not agree with them are not included in the rotation by the public administration.
Marinismo, in its first stage, decided to rely on Chiapas groups, Lebanese oligarchies and their personal clique to achieve national power. He did not achieve his goal, because traditional groups sabotaged his project. Launching a program without considering local factions received the corresponding sanction and, thanks to that, Morenovallismo was able to form. Later, this group exercised that exclusion of which Mario Marín was accused and the elimination of non-conformists and dissidents was even more aggressive.
The political traditionalism of the entity now maintains its balance through the candidacy of Alejandro Armenta; Local politicians have gathered around Morenoballism and Marinism appears as the first level of the next government, but there are elements of other cliques such as Morenovallism, Melquiadism, and regional chiefdoms.
Puebla is a fiefdom of local political groups and they act according to their convenience; Even the regional Catholic high clergy also supports Morenoist Armentism. The local right relied on barbarism, but was never able to get a common project off the ground because the traditional chiefdoms are strong and aggressive.
Puebla returns to a dynamic of patronage, vassalage, caciquismo and clientelism. Rafael Moreno Valle, an autocrat who exceeded power until the sultanate, understood that the entity could not remain in that backwardness because it increased poverty and underdevelopment exponentially; However, the reality of the decomposition of the Mexican neoliberal regime granted new opportunities to populist and traditional groups.
It is true that in Puebla the middle classes, particularly in the most developed cities of the entity, can balance the vote and dispense a complete burden for Morenoism through electoral rationality. However, the civic, social and urban movements of Puebla have not been able to break the caciquil dynamic of political realism. Even Morena capitulated most of its candidacies to achieve a supposed legislative majority that appears complicated.
The national regeneration movement also runs the risk of becoming extinct after this year's elections, the fiefdoms are weighing the formation of regional parties and the exercise of transfuguism to accommodate a reality where the power of the Mexican presidency remains weak and the regions hijack governance. The capitulation of the Morenoist candidates is a sign of the weakness of momentum that the Fourth Transformation had from the beginning.
