Showing posts with label Corporativismo. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Corporativismo. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 18, 2026

Schettino and the Minion Conspirancy

 Schettino and the Minion Conspiracy

Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero




At first glance, comparing Mexicans to Minions seems like an absurd notion. Minions are small, yellow characters who cluster around a boss, organize in groups, obey enthusiastically, and seem to feel safer when someone tells them what to do. Mexico, of course, is a complex, diverse, and contradictory society that cannot be reduced to a caricature. Yet, the comparison raises an interesting question: why do so many human societies need intermediaries, bosses, communities, and safety nets to feel secure?


That is where the resemblance begins. For centuries, a large part of Mexican society has learned to solve problems through personal relationships. When institutions fail to function adequately, what matters is who knows whom, who can intervene, who has access to the government, who controls an organization, or who can protect a community. The local strongman (*cacique*), the priest, the union leader, the politician, the boss, the relative who emigrated to the United States, and even—in some regions—criminal groups, can all fill different roles driven by the same need: achieving security in the face of uncertainty.


Like the Minion, the Mexican might seek out a boss. But that is where the comparison ends, because the Mexican is also capable of rebelling against that boss.


This is perhaps the most important characteristic of our history. Mexico is not merely an obedient, corporatist society; it is also a deeply rebellious one. The War of Independence, the Reform, the Revolution, peasant movements, community struggles, and contemporary protests all demonstrate a persistent resistance to arbitrary power. Mexicans may accept authority when it provides security, but they can also rise up when that authority becomes abusive.


That is why Mexican liberalism has a much deeper history than we sometimes assume. Benito Juárez and the liberals did not triumph because all Mexicans had suddenly turned into liberal philosophers. They triumphed because liberal language offered many groups a tool to combat privileges, special exemptions, and arbitrary power. A peasant could defend his community while simultaneously using the Constitution to challenge the power of a large landowner. A person could be deeply religious and, at the same time, champion legal equality. Liberalism never needed to completely erase communal identities to gain followers.


That is why Mexico cannot be understood simply as a society divided between modern liberals and traditional Mexicans. In reality, many people combine both aspects. They may defend private property, desire economic freedom, and vote democratically, yet also rely on family, community, local leaders, or personal networks for security. They can be liberals while understanding the central role of clientelism within the triad of business elites, the clergy, and local political bosses (*caciques*).


Minions need a boss because they seem to know no other form of organization. Mexicans, however, are aware of another possibility: conspiracy. That is the crucial difference. The Mexican liberal tradition aspires to a state where a person does not need a protector to be safe, because the law alone should suffice. Its fundamental promise is not to turn everyone into isolated individuals, but to prevent anyone from exercising arbitrary power over them.


Mexico’s great historical problem has been that this promise has never been fully realized. When the State fails to provide security, justice, and opportunity, community ties, corporatism, clientelism, migration, and—in some territories—criminal coercion re-emerge.


Perhaps, then, Mexicans resemble minions in that both seek to belong to something that offers security. Yet they differ in a decisive way: for two centuries, Mexicans have been trying to figure out how to live together without arbitrary, unjust, and indifferent bosses. Mexico’s history could well be defined as the story of that very attempt.

Wednesday, January 07, 2026

Internal Party Discipline

 Internal Party Discipline

Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero




Morena's internal dynamics close the year with a clear struggle between its various factions, openly defying presidential directives that advocate against reelection, nepotism, and cronyism, and promote internal democracy.


Several groups within the party are sending clear signals that they are willing to compete from within, against, or outside of Morena.


This reflects the reality of a party with great political power and the ability to mobilize support, but which lacks solid internal mechanisms to manage competition and guarantee discipline.


Something similar occurred during the decline of the hegemonic PRI, when internal divisions transformed its main strengths into its greatest weakness.


Morena's internal struggle, in the lead-up to the upcoming local and federal elections, is a clear example of what political analysts call the breakdown of the dominant coalition.


Barring an extraordinary event, such as Donald Trump deciding to interfere in the nominations, internal divisions within the party are practically inevitable.


Daniel Cosío Villegas once declared that the PRI could only be defeated by the PRI itself, and it seems this maxim is now being applied to Morena.


Although the electoral and judicial institutions lack the autonomy they boasted in recent years, the division among the various internal factions foreshadows a fierce battle for control of the nominations.


In this context, polls or the legal challenges to the processes seem insignificant compared to the intensity of this competition.


Meanwhile, the opposition parties remain vigilant regarding Morena's internal fractures, seeking to exploit them by poaching or strategically recruiting candidates with greater potential.


This has unleashed a wave of political defection, party migrations, and fierce competition among the different groups within the movement.


The country has failed to consolidate an institutionalized, balanced, and pluralistic party system.


Factionalism within the ruling party continues to dictate the course of crucial issues such as the alternation of power, democratization, public policy development, and even a possible shift toward conservative positions.


On the other hand, while arrangements for the presidential succession are already focused on 2030, the aspirants and their political allies are positioning themselves well in advance.


This means that the legislative majority will have neither the strength nor the weakness that Claudia Sheinbaum currently anticipates.