The dispute over populism in Mexico
Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero
In Mexico, both the Catholic Church and the State have been key players in perpetuating clientelistic, corporatist, patrimonial, and kleptocratic practices.
The difference lies not so much in the methods they employ, but in the age and formality with which these mechanisms have become embedded in their structures.
For centuries, the Church has operated on multiple levels, articulating networks of social, cultural, and political support that, in many cases, have functioned as a kind of parallel or complementary power structure to that of the State.
Religion has been used to consolidate loyalties, sustain certain elites, and, at times, reinforce social dependency through the distribution of spiritual and material benefits.
It is not surprising that, in a country with so much poverty, the Church continues to be an actor that, at different levels, employs these same mechanisms to maintain its influence and social control.
For its part, the Mexican State, since its inception, has resorted to the same logic, only at a more institutionalized and formal level.
Clientelism, corporatism, and patrimonialism have been recurring tools in the country's political history.
Governments, regardless of their political affiliation, have distributed resources, positions, favors, and benefits in a system designed to consolidate loyalties and ensure their hold on power.
The difference with the Church lies in the fact that, on many occasions, these practices have been carried out within the framework of legality, or at least under the guise of legality, through social programs, the allocation of resources, institutional manipulation, and networks of intermediaries that guarantee territorial and social control.
Corruption, in its most basic form, has been a structural element of the relationship between elites and vulnerable communities.
What is evident is that, fundamentally, there is no substantial difference in the methods used by the Church and the State to maintain their power.
Both actors have resorted to clientelism and corporatism, only at different times and with varying degrees of formality and longevity.
While the Church has historically operated on a more social, cultural, and religious level, the State has employed these mechanisms in public administration and resource management.
However, in practice, both maintain a similar logic: the distribution of benefits in exchange for loyalties, votes, or social support, in a context where poverty and inequality are plagues that fuel this dynamic.
The central problem is that these practices reinforce a system of domination that keeps Mexican society in a state of permanent vulnerability.
Poverty, lack of opportunities, and weak economic structures make communities easy prey for these mechanisms.
Society, for the most part, lacks the tools and institutions that would allow it to demand rights or build a strong citizenry.
In this scenario, both the Church and the State operate within a system where clientelism is presented as the only way to access certain minimal benefits, thus preventing the formation of a genuine democratic culture and a civil society capable of challenging these powers.
Joy Langston and Bernardo Barranco have investigated several cases where these sociological phenomena can be observed: the clientelism of the PRI/MORENA coalition and the corruption scandals within the high clergy.
The electoral struggle, then, becomes a battle for the hegemony of clientelism, where political, religious, and social actors intertwine in a scenario where poverty and social inequalities are the main ingredients fueling this dispute.
The competition is not only for votes, but also for the ability to offer immediate benefits and promises of well-being that, in reality, perpetuate social dependency and exclusion.
From the critiques of authors such as Loris Zanatta and Mario Vargas Llosa, we can understand that populism is not just a campaign method, but a way of consolidating power based on emotional manipulation, the distribution of benefits, and the destruction of institutional checks and balances.
Clientelism in Mexico has become a structure that, beyond official rhetoric, functions as a system in which intermediaries, both from the government and the Church, maintain long-term relationships with communities, fostering a culture of dependency and weakening mechanisms for democratic participation.
As long as a large and robust middle class does not exist in Mexico, we can hardly speak of an autonomous citizenry, a strong civil society, or institutions capable of confronting these clientelistic mechanisms.
