Sunday, November 28, 2021

AMLO and the Black Circle

AMLO and the Black Circle

Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero 



Pablo González Casanova stated that populism constituted a double-edged weapon of protection for Mexico. On the one hand, it is a force that feeds the acritical attitude of most of the social movements and caciquile regions of the country to the point of almost bursting the fragile order. On the other hand, populism also constitutes an auxiliary factor for the armed forces in national defense against a probable foreign invasion, particularly from the United States.

The militarization of the country confirms that the National Army, a product of the Mexican Revolution, is the true force of governance in Mexico. The complaints about the facade that democracy guards in our presidentialism represent the modernizing liberal frustration that Western evangelical scholars have to experience as a permanent martyrology. Antonio Machado, Denisse Dresser, Jorge Portilla and Juan Linz confirm what Huntington establishes, Latin America is light years away from being Western. With few events in Latin America, it is immediately verified that presidentialism does not work outside the United States, well, almost in no country. Mexican authoritarian presidentialism will never be like US presidentialism. This does not imply a lack of attention in the operation, handling and security of the system. Outside the United States, presidentialism almost always ends in coups.

Mexico sheltered itself from the Latin American presidential dynamics thanks to an Official Party - understood by the concept of military corporatist capacity - that coerced the different political forces to solve the problem of presidential succession and public administration. It was not easy, the Army of the Mexican Revolution faced the imperialism of the Catholic Church and the United States. It did not win, but it did obtain a Pareto balance that provided meager national stability.

In a fictionalized way, Velasco Piña exposes the Mexicanism of the armed forces that develops into a populist and confused revolutionary nationalism, but with an authoritarian clarity that was executed many times to obtain the PRI pax.

The imperial presidency wants to return, although the Official Party no longer exists. Will the Black Circle be able to contain and coerce the PRI cliques that are dispersed in different political parties? Will the Black Circle be able to institutionalize, once again, an Official Party?

That militarism is an inevitable variable in the governance of extra-western countries is an axiom of political science. What militarism is talked about in Mexico regarding the Black Circle? During the PRIATO, the armed forces constituted a defensive bloc against imperialism that obtained a moderate colonialism. There are many coincidences between the Spanish Francoism and the revolutionary nationalism, but also great differences. With its flats, the colonialist pact of the Mexican Army gained greater independence than many cases in the Iberosphere.

The alternation elections caused a decrease in military power. President Felipe Calderón promoted a militarization of the country that ran aground in US geopolitics. Militarization during neoliberalism made Mexico like Colombia. In both cases, the war on drug trafficking has been lost, to the benefit of North America. Both countries are militarized, the Colombian army is more like a US occupation force; what should not happen in Mexico.

Revolutionary nationalism, the strange doctrine that justified the Army of the Mexican Revolution as the backbone of PRIATO, failed to consolidate after World War II. Over time, the centrality of the armed forces, caciquil corporatist populism, and the pragmatism of the ruling class, deteriorated Mexican nationalism, which with the political transition gave up even more. If Mexico is to be an authoritarian democracy, a justification for revolutionary nationalism is indispensable, so that the black circle preserves the legitimacy of organized violence.

AMLO confirms that the center of the Mexican political system is the Army, although it is also important to reflect under what circumstances. The positioning of the Army is done with the tutelage of the United States, it no longer seems the domain of an independent army.

Still, the United States is in total global decline. Mexico is in a position similar to that of the early nineteenth century when the Spanish empire imploded, orphanhood offered the possibility of autonomy and freedom, but the opportunity was wasted for lack of responsibility and cohesion, for lack of a national objective.

Perhaps it is true that the strengthening of the Mexican army is a necessity, the prince must take care of his weapons before his clothing. However, that the strengthening of the armed forces implies the strengthening of the people and not the occupation of the United States informally as occurs in Colombia.

Monday, November 22, 2021

Puebla. Perpetual political violence

 Puebla. Perpetual political violence



Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero 

What happened in Tecamachalco cannot be evaded as a sign of the radical competition and frontal struggle for power that the entity is experiencing. Times are filled with violence every time a government succession looms and, unfortunately, rudeness is transmitted to society, which is also shattered. Puebla is, each government period, more montuna, peasant, caciquil, poor.

The deceased analyst, Dr. Raymundo García, stated that the conflicts for control of Puebla were led by two types of PRI members: those who were entrusted to the Federal District and those who protected local interests. Ceteris Paribus, the criterion continues to adjust to reality. At the same time, the solution also takes effect: Order! Even if it comes from the center; it is exposed in another work of central importance to understand local politics.

How much disorder are poblanos capable of supporting? Much. Like all Mexicans. So long, until the victims are members of the political class. The disorder does not support the caciques.

The force that the political cliques use to resolve their differences results in the fall of socioeconomic indicators, in the incompetence of public policies, deinstitutionalization and the charismatic horror of the actors who represent the authority.

As a result of morenovallismo, violence in the entity has increased exponentially. But who can say that he was not morenovallista? If the violence were the product of the death throes of Morenovallismo, the state of things would be understood; However, what represents the level of terror that things reach, is a political struggle and factional struggle where Moreno-Valles is no longer the protagonist. They are the historical leaderships that are presumed indispensable, but that have led Puebla down the path of impoverishment. The State continues to lose everything in front of Tlaxcala and Veracruz, the sentence of "die intelligence" remains the core.

As in any struggle, the animosity of the protagonists makes them lose sight of the urgent need to rebuild democratic governance. Political institutions have not been transformed in Puebla, which implies that scenarios such as Zacatecas, Guerrero, Tamaulipas or Sinaloa, will soon become our paradigm.