Even floor. The difficult construction of internal democracy in political parties
Diego Martin Velazquez Caballero
During the last days the problem of the methods for the designation of candidates in the electoral coalitions and political movements of Mexico persists. The disagreement with the rules of internal competition and its interpretation makes it clear that the appointment of candidates motivates the defense of political rights, turncoatism and political entrepreneurship in Mexico and Latin America.
These phenomena are linked to a disease of political institutes and party systems that seems to find no solution. Will we reach a scenario, similar to the French one, in which we see people who are far from partisan alignments govern? Perhaps this happens in Latin America and explains the lack of institutionality in our political systems.
Given the natural partisan factionalism, as well as the discontent of some leaders, it has become a common currency for rulers and public representatives to decide to found new political parties. This situation, already widespread, means that -as in the French case- political systems have as many parties as wines and cheeses has the French country. Multipartism -more nominal than real-, in any case, generates problems for governance and the production of public policies with a high social impact.
Just as it is impossible to affirm conclusively that the parties are oligarchies and that each character must understand where they are getting into; it is absurd to conceive them under the model of Plato's Academy. Internal democracy counts; if not, why propose rules of participation? "For PRI members, better PRI members," said Granados Chapa and, up to now, observing their behavior, it seems that PRI members of all parties continue to govern us.
In Mexico, political parties do not end up consolidating. 2018 meant a hurricane that swept away the flimsy institutionality they had left. Years later and even with the vast experience of their leaders, they have not yet developed an institutional design capable of regulating organizational mechanisms, formation of militants, aggregation of interests and construction of a government plan.
Visceral factionalism in Latin America forces us to think seriously about the Sartorian proposals for the Second Round of elections or about semi-presidential mechanisms that reduce the negative influence of particularisms. The divisions do not benefit anyone, much less the country. Mexico's main concern has been national unity, and the internal life of the parties demonstrates the distance we keep from a community project.
In this failure, the most frustrating role has been that of electoral institutions, which underutilized huge budgets to develop civic political culture and make democratic principles the only way to make decisions. Everyone ended up agreeing with the president, but no one recognizes him.
The democratic rules generate that uncertainty typical of those who participate, knowing that they meet the requirements, respect the guidelines, compete and hope that their talents will produce a result. Without clear and functional competition mechanisms, the internal life of the parties generates gangrene and poisons the organization and the country.