Incentives: Time, Income, and Effort
Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero
The struggle to confront drug-related insecurity in Mexico reveals a profound disconnect between political extremes and the national challenges the country faces. Attempting to resolve such a critical problem with lukewarm measures or mere good intentions is nothing more than evading the gravity of the issue, a tactic that has unfortunately characterized Mexico's economic policy since the 1970s. While the economy should be based on concrete facts, the real obstacle lies in the lack of political will to dismantle a deeply entrenched colonial-feudal system that has existed for almost five centuries in Latin America.
Expert Luis Rubio astutely analyzes the situation of the Mexican middle class, facing a bleak outlook. For many families, obtaining quality education, formal employment, decent housing, and access to credit can take more than two decades, while migrating to the United States allows them to access these resources in less than ten years. Even more disturbing, the quick profits promised by drug trafficking offer some a third of these opportunities in just five years or less. Given this contrast, it is not surprising that nearly fifty million Mexicans have chosen to migrate illegally to the United States, seeking a life that—although difficult—they consider a thousand times better than subsisting in poverty in their country. At the same time, drug trafficking is consolidating itself as one of the largest informal employers in key regions. In this context, does anyone really believe that the current government's welfare policies and clientelistic programs will achieve significant change? Do they truly think that the Morena scholarships and corrupt Morena clientelism will improve the situation? If the idea of the "six-thousand-dollar" movement sounded like idiocy in 2007, how does the idea of the "two-thousand-dollar" movement sound in 2026? They could have at least taken the joke Mejía Prieto tells about the "fucking lemon" from the Echeverría era. Morena's progressive illiteracy is incapable of remembering the projects of the National Citrus Institute, the National Coffee Institute, and so many other ideas that, in the long run, didn't seem so far-fetched; perhaps to give the State relative autonomy.
Although remittances and drug money represent less than 20% of the national GDP, the real dilemma lies in how the rest of the formal economy is managed and distributed. Dependence on foreign investors and maquiladoras has generated a structure where the main benefits end up outside the country, leaving Mexico as a mere cog in the global system. The banking sector and major industrial sectors are not controlled by Mexicans, and therefore, a large portion of the profits flows out to the capital's countries of origin. In this economic cycle, where extraction is prioritized over internal development, how can we expect a real solution?
Rational choice theory states that there are no bad actions, only flawed incentives. And Mexico remains trapped in this logic: its public policies, especially under the current administration known as the Fourth Transformation, have perpetuated incentives that fuel corruption and reinforce inequalities. Not even the public budget seems to escape this fate, replicating old wasteful practices that previously defended failed models of autarky. The Mexican government's disconnect is also evident when it acts blindly toward its own geopolitical reality. The informal economy has allowed millions to survive thanks to its ties with the United States, but the government insists on confronting strategic American interests without asking what Mexico gains from this antagonism. The synergies between the two countries have proven to be, albeit imperfect, necessary for distributing mutual benefits. Mexican migrants understand this; the Mexican government seems to deny it.
Meanwhile, a socioeconomic model—the "Habsburg Model"—persists, centralizing power and privileges in historical minorities such as the Catholic Church, Europeans, Spaniards, and local political bosses, relegating the majority to the informal sector. If the United States ever decides to more formally stabilize its economic influence in Mexico, our country could better integrate into a favorable regional framework. Otherwise, it will remain a secondary player on a global chessboard where its potential is constantly underestimated.
Building a governable and prosperous Mexico requires a bold vision. Recent electoral history offers lessons in this regard: just as millions of Mexicans have decided to change the country's internal political course, millions more have opted to strengthen their future from abroad, in the United States. However, no true transformation will be possible without definitively breaking with inherited and entrenched structures. At the end of the day, social peace, economic growth, and true security demand clear decisions: integrating Mexico into a more robust North American dynamic and ending a feudal model that has no place in modern times. There will be no development in Mexico until it integrates with North America and breaks with the Habsburg model, which the current administration defends more than the Catholic far right.
