Trump and the War Against the Mexican Future of North America
Diego Martín Velázquez Caballero
In The Next 100 Years, George Friedman formulated one of the most unsettling geopolitical hypotheses regarding the future of Mexico and the United States: the problem of the 21st century would not be Mexico invading the United States, but rather the two countries becoming so deeply integrated that the political border would cease to align with the economic, demographic, and cultural borders.
The scenario he envisioned is paradoxical. The United States would initially need Mexican workers to offset its aging population; immigration would fuel growth; decades later, robotics would reduce the demand for labor; Washington would then attempt to curb immigration and reverse its effects. Yet, by then, millions of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans would be deeply rooted in the American Southwest. Simultaneously, Mexico would have gained significantly greater economic power. Friedman places the moment when this combination could trigger a crisis of sovereignty and identity in North America in the decades following 2070.
This is where the fundamental difference from Samuel Huntington arises. In *Who Are We?*, Huntington viewed Mexican immigration and Hispanization as a threat to the Anglo-Protestant identity of the United States, warning of the risk of a culturally bifurcated nation. The implicit solution was to strengthen assimilation and reclaim a shared national identity.
Friedman, by contrast, poses a geopolitical question: what will happen when the Mexican transformation of North America has become irreversible?
Donald Trump’s policy can be interpreted—albeit as a hypothesis rather than a proven intent—as an attempt to preemptively address that dilemma. His strategy combines pressure regarding migration, tariffs, the fight against cartels, and an increasing willingness to employ instruments of extraterritorial power. In February 2025, Trump imposed an additional 25% tariff on Mexican goods, citing a national emergency related to migration and drugs; he later modified and partially suspended these measures based on the level of Mexican cooperation. In 2025, orders were also issued to designate criminal organizations as terrorist groups, even as U.S. officials debated more aggressive options against the cartels.
The stated goal is to combat drugs, migration, and organized crime. Yet there is a deeper geopolitical dimension: reducing U.S. dependence on Mexico before that reliance becomes structurally irreversible. By 2026, no one can deny that Mexico and the United States are on the brink of war.
Therein lies the historical paradox. The economic integration that Washington might perceive as a vulnerability is, at the same time, one of the greatest sources of American power vis-à-vis China and the BRICS. Mexico is not merely a neighbor; it is an industrial, energy, demographic, and logistical platform integrated with the United States. The alternative to such integration could end up weakening the very bloc Washington needs to strengthen.
The analogy to Adolf Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa should be understood as a warning, not a historical equivalence. A strategy aimed at destroying a neighbor's capacity can end up destroying the very conditions of security and prosperity that justified the strategy in the first place. The true risk for the United States would not be the "Mexicanization" of North America, but rather interpreting North American integration as a threat when it could serve as the nation's primary strategic advantage in the face of the rise of China and other powers.
Friedman’s question, therefore, takes on renewed relevance: will the United States attempt to prevent the "Mexican future" of North America, or will it learn to transform that future into a source of American power? The history of the next fifty years will depend, in large measure, on that choice.
